Internet Infrastructure & AccessThis is a featured page

Overview
Although the online population and internet usage is generally increasing as a whole across Asia, there still exists a fairly strict infrastructure and access restrictions in the region. Especially for countries like Iran and Burma, they have implemented high costs of internet connectivity for their citizens as a convenient attempt to cut off all internet access completely.
In the Islamic countries, online content going against religion, culture and social norms take precedence in online filtering; other countries like Vietnam, Burma and China focuses on political opposition information or other relevant subversive content.

1. Burma
Burma is one of thirty remaining countries in the world whereby less than 1% of the Burmese population has internet access. This is despite it having the highest rate of increase in five years within SEA. There are only 2 ISPs in Burma, the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPT) and the semi-private Bagan Cybertech (BC). Each is estimated to have 15,000 subscribers, placing Burma’s online penetration at 0.6% at most.

Computers are also too expensive for the average Burmese citizen, and dial-ups only provide access to the Myanmar Internet and state-run e-mail services. Hence, most Burmese visit internet cafes, which are more common in the bigger cities. These facilities also use various softwares in order to bypass online monitors & censors. Although Burma does not manage its filtering regime with the same sophistication as other countries with similar repressive online environments, the control of the junta is constantly felt in access restriction, the high cost of services, and the frequently brutal clampdown on information and expression in all other spheres of Burmese life.

1.1 Myanmar Web Wide (MWW)
The Burmese citizens have access to a sharply limited version of the Internet, which they call the MWW. It is implemented by the SPDC (State Peace & Development Council) - a group of military officials who maintain authoritarian rule over the state.

The objective of the MWW is to prevent netizens from accessing information or artistic works that are deemed subversive, cause ethnic tensions, or encourage political instability. The military junta thinks of the Internet as more like a LAN (Local Area Network) - an internal network with as few links to the outside world as they can manage, particularly when it comes to political information. (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_in_Burma)

1.2 Blockage Statistics (2005)
(research taken from OpenNet Initiative)

Political opposition and pro-democracy sites 88%
E-mail service providers sites 85%
Pornographic sites 65%
Gambling sites 24%
Group Web sites 18%
Free Web space sites 18%


2. China
China's media regulation and state laws, cybercafe regulations, and content providers are designed to be consistent with censoring activities and government ideology. Every Chinese who signs up for Internet access has to register with local police department within 30 days. In addition, volunteers guided by ISP employees, also help to monitor online sites, chat rooms and bulletin boards to "clean up" and prevent any restricted information from being published. The core of China's internet infrastructure relies heavily on Cisco technology. Activists and human rights organizations have for years been trying to charge Cisco and other Western corporations with actively assisting China in developing & implementing censorship and surveillance systems. (read here for more)

China attempts to suppress various publications with information related to
  • “Subversive” political movements
  • Garnering support for a free Tibet
  • China's Olympic protests
  • Falun Gong spiritual movement
  • Pro-democracy & Pro-Western commentaries
  • Bypassing online filters & content restrictions
  • See here for more specifics

2.1 Golden Shield Project a.k.a Great Firewall of China (see here for more)
This project started in 1998, and is basically a firewall erected by China as a barrier to prevent Chinese netizens from accessing prohibited information from the outside world. There are four primary levels of restrictions. In addition to these techniques, an estimate 30,000 censors scan for and remove prohibited content accessible within the nation.

2.1.1. DNS (Domain Name System) Block
Sites that are blacklisted get DNS failure or get redirected to other content. This was the technique employed against google.cn to force them to add filtering to their web index. For some time, all access to google.cn was redirected to their Chinese competitor baidu. The other application of this method is to return DNS lookup failure so i.e. searches for http://www.illegalsite.com will return “not found”.

2.1.2. Connect
Scanning the requested URL string for target keywords regardless of the domain name specified in the URL. Inspections are made for every connection requests leaving China. If the IP address is currently blacklisted, a connection reset will be performed causing the connection to fail.

2.1.3. URL & IP Block
If the URL contains words on the illegal word blacklist, the connection is redirected infinitely. If unacceptable words are found in the URL, they redirect the connection repeated. Some browsers hang while others return an error message. In the case of an IP block, access to a certain IP address will be denied. If the target website is hosted in a shared server, all websites on the same server will be blocked as well.

2.1.4. Content Block
At this level, the DNS lookup has been successful and the connection has been made and content is being returned to the user. As the content is returned to the requesting user inside China, it is scanned for unapproved keywords and phrases. If any are found, the connection is broken immediately. On top of breaking the connection mid-way, consecutive request attempts may eventually draw official scrutiny.

2.2 Internet Access
2.2.1 Supervisory Bodies (see http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/Voyage_au_coeur_de_la_censure_GB.pdf)
  • The Internet Propaganda Administrative Bureau & the Centre for the Study of Public Opinion
  • Information Office of the State Council (the Executive)
  • The Internet Bureau and Bureau of Information & Public Opinion
  • CPC's Publicity Department (former Propaganda Department)

2.2.2 Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
ISPs track the identities of people online and what pages are visited. Customers' account numbers, phone numbers and IP addresses must be kept on file. ISPs can be held legally responsible if customers use their systems to violate laws.

2.2.3 Internet Content Providers (ICPs)
Publish content and operate bulletin boards are legally responsible for content they display. ICPs must also set up systems of secure login and registration to be able to verify users' identities and track online activities. If they fail to do so, their business licenses will be revoked and employees could be arrested.

2.2.4 Cybercafes
These outlets are required to keep detailed logs of customers online activity for at least 2 months. If a user tries to access forbidden Web sites, the cafe is to disconnect the user and file a report with state agencies immediately. Penalties for such violations range from fines to imprisonments. Users cannot use cyber services without an identification card, which is kept on record for at least 2 months as well. Children under 16 are not allowed in cybercafes, where people usually play violent video games.

2.2.5 Emails
The Chinese keep a close eye on communication tools such as e-mail. E-mail is filtered by service providers. This method is based on the same technology that blocks spam. Body text and subject lines are scanned and blocked if anything questionable is found.


3. Iran

Iran is placed among the top countries in terms of rate of growth of internet access, reflecting a more than 500% growth in five years. The nation also has the second highest online population in the Middle East after Israel. The capital Tehran, has up to 1,500 cybercafes and pre-paid cards are readily accessible throughout.

When internet was introduced initially, many saw it as an effective way of circumventing the strict Iranian media laws. Till now, many Iranian still trust the internet more than any media outlet even with the strict laws governing the media. The largest ISP in Iran is currently the Data Communication Company of Iran (DCI). It is also the provider in which most ISPs obtain their internet connectivity by. The DCI is a subsidiary of the Ministry for Information and Communication Technology (ICT), which controls and sets the policies of DCI.

Every ISP must be approved by the ICT and DCI, and adhere to strict guidelines specified by the Iranian government. Failing to comply will result in heavy penalties and in addition, internet users must give a written promise not to access non-Islamic sites and register their websites with the government. Despite the controls, high costs of internet access is the primary barrier to internet proliferation within the country rather than political or technological controls.


4. North Korea
For most North Koreans, access to online content is exceedingly rare and limited to the few Web sites within Kwangmyong - the nation’s domestic intranet. Merely a few thousand of the North Koreans have Internet access and it is heavily censored by the state government. As such, there is no nation-wide Internet in North Korea as it is illegal. Even if allowed, there is no existing infrastructure to host it. Although there are a few cybercafes in the bigger cities, the outlets only have access to North Korea's closed Internet that is not merely filtered - but wholly state-created.

The state government decides all accessible content on Kwangmyong. User conduct and activities are carefully monitored as well. The content available is mainly intended for academic and corporate use at specific research institutes and schools. Furthermore, only government ministries, a few selected corporations and individuals have the computers, telecommunications capacity, and authority necessary to connect to this national intranet.

Internet users in North Korea largely comprises of the rich, well-connected and foreigners. Access is provided for the military, intelligence, and few privileged research centers only. A few - including those in Kim Jung Il’s inner circle enjoy the rare unfiltered Internet access via satellite link from Germany servers. On top of this, a majority of North Korea’s internet users are dependent upon ISPs (Internet Service Providers) in China, and are subjected accordingly to China’s internet censorship regulations. Few can also afford the high hourly fees of US$10.00 for internet cafes, thus limiting online usage to diplomats, tourists or journalists. This is so as to prevent the average North Korean from accessing the resources and services of such facilities.


5. Vietnam
As of September 2007, 20% of the Vietnamese is able to access the Internet with most accessing it at nearby cybercafes. This percentage is set to increase considering that it was at 12% two years earlier. The local government also has plans to increase internet usage to 35% by 2010. As more and more people are getting online, the complexities of the filtering system increase as well.

Vietnam’s system is based on the French and thus is heavily reliant on its postal offices for internet access. The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications lists 13 Internet access services providers licensed in Vietnam. Vietnam's ISPs implement filtering differently, with one relying on removing listings for prohibited sites from its Domain Name System (DNS) servers while the other uses a system that displays a "block page" when users try to access banned sites.

The majority of Vietnamese access the Internet in cybercafes where it is relatively affordable. In 2005, the government issued a directive to step up surveillance in cybercafes. Owners of such facilities are expected to undertake a course which will enable them to monitor internet users better. User's identities are also expected to be checked before use. It is the onus of the owner to ban users from surfing ‘pornographic and subversive’ sites.




Internet Infrastructure & Access - Social Media and PR across Asia



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